Proving who we are — to potential landlords and employers, to the NHS when we are at our most vulnerable, to the financial institutions who take care of our money — is not just a digitisation project, but a critical infrastructure programme that could have a significant impact on future levels of trust and social cohesion in the UK.

This is not simply a digital project or an efficiency measure — it is a social project that poses fundamental questions about trust, human relationships, and who we are as a country.

At a time when public finances are under pressure, expenditure on digital ID must be shown to deliver real public benefit. We estimate the cost to the taxpayer of the programmes already in flight to be somewhere in excess of £700m. Getting digital ID wrong could not only be a misuse of public money at a time when the country could least afford it, it could also undermine public trust and deepen social divisions — creating new problems that this Government has little time and few resources to solve.

At such a tumultuous time for public trust, and after years of political chaos, rebuilding trust, social cohesion, and bonds between people and communities is a critical and acknowledged project for this Government — one that cannot and should not be undermined by legacy technologies that are being driven through with a single-minded focus on productivity and growth.

“Digital ID” is a deceptively simple term that refers to a wide range of approaches to verifying, tracking, and monitoring people’s identity and to a number of different methods of storing and processing any related information. The term is currently used in the media and in policy proposals by both think tanks and Government departments to refer to a wide- range of end uses, including a single-sign on for government websites, age verification in shops and bars, immigration control and management, and the roll-out of compulsory identity cards. This rapid scoping study aims to understand whether the HM Government’s plans to expand digital identity verification in the UK will deliver against public expectations, address social concerns, and support the cost- effective delivery of a mission-driven government.

During August and September 2024, Careful Industries worked in partnership with Survation to map the current and unfolding delivery and policy landscape for digital and to conduct public polling to understand more about people’s needs and

preferences. This report brings together the outputs of this work, showing how the complex and often obfuscated landscape of policy proposals and technology solutions do not fully align with the public’s needs, levels of adoption, and interest in digital ID.

Public polling for this study took place in the aftermath of the racist riots across the UK, against a backdrop of febrile media debate on immigration policy and only weeks after
the General Election result had shown Labour to have lost trust with large sections of the Muslim community. This study touches on public sentiment about crime and immigration, attitudes to and experiences of race and racism, generational divides, and trust in big tech; it highlights both the significant social spillover effects of technology policies and the very different day-to-day experiences that people from different demographic groups have when going about their day-to-day lives and completing essential tasks.

1.1 What are the Government's plans for digital ID?

The Government has not yet published a strategic overview of its approach to digital ID. Through desk research we have surfaced the three solutions currently in play:

  • GOV.UK One Login for use with public services;

  • Digital Verification Services developed by the private sector for use with public and private services;

  • and the eVisa scheme for use by non-UK citizens.

Overall levels of expenditure on this programme are unclear, but it looks likely to be in excess of £700m. The lack of transparency on these plans, which will be instrumental to establishing “the digital centre of government”, is concerning, particularly at a time when the public purse is under so much pressure. [2]

Government position the benefits of these various solutions as:

  • reducing crime and fraud;

  • reducing costs across service delivery;

  • unlocking productivity by increasing public efficiency, chiefly by making it easier for people to verify their identity in dealings with the private sector and by reducing the time spent logging into government websites.

In addition to a lack of financial transparency, there is a lack of information on how these different services will interact with one another, no detailed cost-benefit analysis, and no risk assessment that shows what impacts these tools will, in aggregate, have across society and on people’s quality of life.

1.2 What do the public want?

57% of people think the UK should have a single form of ID, and there is relatively broad support for a single, non-digital, voluntary ID provided by government.

However, what looks like a coherent picture of public interest at a general population level breaks down into fairly partisan opinions, with dividing lines appearing between different demographic groups:

  • People aged over 65 think of digital ID as a tool that should be used by other people to improve law and order. This group has the lowest levels of awareness of both digital verification services (21%, including 3% who self- report as “very aware”, significantly lower than other age groups) and digital identity services (35%), with just over a fifth of people having used a government DVS, half as many as those aged 18-24. In spite of lower levels of use, those aged over 65 are almost twice as likely as those aged 18-24 to report feeling comfortable using a DVS. Just over one-third of people aged over 65 are concerned digital ID might lead to discrimination, compared with 61% of people aged 25-34, and this group has the lowest level of interest in public efficiencies—rating crime
    and fraud and managing immigration as the joint most positive uses of digital ID, with using the NHS and the simplicity of a single form of identification coming in joint second place.

  • Younger people are torn between wanting the convenience of digital ID and feeling concern about the issues of fairness and exclusion. Overall they are mindful of the potential of digital ID to be used to discriminate against people, with 60% of 18-24 year olds and 61% 25-34 year olds expressing concern about discrimination caused by lack of access to suitable ID and more than 50% of both age groups agreeing that digital ID could enable police discrimination. 18-34 year olds also prize all forms of simplicity more highly than older respondents, with over a quarter of respondents from each group seeing a single ID as making it easier to be identified by the state and similar numbers being in favour of personal simplicity.

  • Black and Asian people are more likely to be early adopters of digital ID and are more aware of the risks of discrimination and exclusion that come with formal identity programmes. More than half of respondents who identified as either Black or Asian are aware of the Government’s Digital Verification Service and around 50% of people from both groups have used it. In line with this, over 60% of Black and 58% of Asian people surveyed are in favour of a single ID. However, there are also high levels of concern about the social impacts of digital ID, with 60% of Black and 66% of Asian respondents expressing concern that digital ID could lead to social exclusion, and 53% of people from both groups expressing concern over the impact that digital technologies have on people’s freedoms.

  • White people are less likely to have made up their minds about or to have used digital ID. 31% of those who identified as White, White British or Other in responses already use digital ID, and the most notable finding from this group is the number of issues on which no overall preference was indicated. For instance, 47% think it would make opening a bank account easier, while 46% say it would not change or would worsen the experience; 45% think it would make it easier to prove identity to a landlord while 49% think it would not change or worsen the experience. This group has a lower level of concern than other demographics of the potential of a single digital ID to have discriminatory outcomes, with 49% noting the risk of discrimination for those who do not have ID and 39% seeing that this could enable the police to discriminate against ethnic minorities by disproportionately asking them to produce their identification card. However, it has a relatively high level of concern about digital ID giving the state power to deny rights to members of the public.

There are, however, a few things that everyone agrees on.

There is broad public support to use digital ID to reduce crime and fraud — but the potential for digital ID to also lead to an increase in policing power is the most contentious issue in the survey. There is a clear division between the opinions of older and white respondents and younger and ethnically diverse respondents, making this one of the most significant and urgent social issues to be addressed in parallel with the roll-out of digital ID programmes.

There is low trust in big tech, with 54% of people saying that big technology companies have too much control over their lives, and Apple and Google lagging behind the Home Office at the bottom of the “trusted data holder” league table. A majority of people (44%) would also prefer the Government to deliver an ID service, in preference to either a large or small tech firm.

Immigration is high on the list of public concerns that could be managed with digital ID, but trust in the Home Office is very erratic for people from ethnically diverse backgrounds, pointing to high levels of concern about operational safety and transparency.

Only 43% of people think people should show digital ID to access public services, with the highest levels of support for this coming from people aged over 65. When asked to rank positive uses of digital ID, easier access to public services was ranked seventh out of the eight choices given; the efficiency savings created by a single form of digital ID were ranked eighth.

1.3 Is the Government delivering what people want?

The stand-out ask from the survey is for a single form of ID, delivered by the Government. Current plans do not deliver on this.

The Government is prioritising crime, fraud, and immigration management. These priorities are in line with public interest, but there are no announced plans to address the issues
of concern relating to the expansion of policing or to build levels of trust in the Home Office. Likewise, concerns about exclusion and discrimination are not currently being addressed.

The Digital Verification Scheme will make it easier for people to use digital ID to prove their identity in the private sector, but this is a plural rather than a single scheme, delivered by
a number of third-party businesses rather than by Government.

The prioritisation of Government efficiency as a productivity measure is not top of the public shopping list, and accessing public services did not surface as a pain point in the research. This commitment is currently out of step with public preferences, as stated in the survey.

Government priorities are firmly rooted in growth. While technology will undoubtedly be an important mechanism for delivering some kinds of growth, public technology investments must also contribute to changing lives for the better and building a stronger society: delivering efficiencies and boosting business must not come with the added cost of increased social division.  

If digital ID will be a fundamental component of this Government’s approach to delivering a mission-driven renewal, its development must be inline with the commitments in the King’s Speech to ensure “security, fairness and opportunity for all”. [3]

1.4 Recommendations

These recommendations speak to the importance of transparency, equity, and stewardship; of the timely necessity of stepping away from divisive and discriminatory policy making; and the importance of ensuring public investment delivers real public benefit for everyone.

To ensure better governance, the Government should:

  • Improve transparency and communication by publishing a Cross-Department Digital ID Strategy, with full costings and a comprehensive political, economic, social, and technological risk assessment; this should be subject to scrutiny by the Public Accounts Committee.

  • Put in place Ministerial accountability for the multiple and overlapping social and community impacts and outcomes of digital ID. As implementation is cross departmental, we recommend this duty sits in the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government; this post should also have responsibility for ensuring that effective monitoring and redress measures are in place and that ongoing relationships
    with relevant civil society groups are fostered and maintained.

To recognise social plurality, the Government should:

  • Undertake an annual tracker study, backed up with deep qualitative research, that builds: a fine- grained understanding of different demographic and community needs, a reliable picture of ongoing changes to social attitudes; and a record of the unfolding challenges and changes created by digital ID. This should be commissioned by the MHCLG minister with oversight for digital ID, and the results should be made publicly available.

  • There is high demand for a voluntary, government- backed form of identity that people can use to prove their identity to private sector entities, including banks, landlords, and retailers. To deliver this we recommend that One Login is extended and made available for use beyond government services; to ensure this happens in a privacy and rights-protecting way, we recommend the existing Identity Assurance Principles for Identity Services in Government are put on a statutory footing in the forthcoming Digital Information and Smart Data Bill, overseen by the One Login Privacy Advisory Group.

[3]The King’s Speech 2024”, The Prime Ministers Office (July 2024), p. 39